Former Employee’s Alleged Criminal Activities Relevant to Determine “Wage Earning Capacity” for Purposes of Assessing Entitlement to Workers Compensation Benefits

In a case I brought to the Michigan Supreme Court, which remanded in Omian v Chrysler, 495 Mich. 859 (2013), to the Court of Appeals for consideration of my appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals has now reversed the decision I originally appealed.  In Omian v. Chrysler.COA.Published, the Court of Appeals agreed that evidence of a former employee’s ability to engage in a financially lucrative criminal enterprise generally allows consideration of that employee’s ability to “continue to earn wages” despite his or her claim that a work-related injury entitles him to wage-loss benefits.  I argued that an ability to earn wages, any wages, even those gained through nefarious criminal activities, should be admissible to demonstrate that the claimant is not entitled to be paid wage-loss benefits based on a claimed disabling injury – an injury he or she claims is preventing him from earning wages in other legal and gainful employment.

Although the Court did not agree with all of my arguments, it reversed the case on the main principal espoused and directs the administrative tribunal to consider the evidence.

 

Insurance Coverage Not Available to Employer Mistakenly Listed as Insured on State-Required Workers Compensation Forms

The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled on Tuesday, February 17, 2015, that insurance coverage was not available to an employer (Delphi) merely because the insurers had errantly listed the employer on forms required to be filed with the state to notify it of the existence of workers’ compensation insurance.

Delphi had multiple subsidiaries, some of which had been and were insured by policies issued by the insurers for workers compensation claims coverage.  However, Delphi itself was self-insured, and did not therefore require or purchase workers compensation insurance from an insurance carrier.  The insurance companies had mistakenly listed Delphi, generally, rather than the insured subsidiaries, on the forms required by the state of Michigan to list and certify the existence of workers compensation insurance coverage for employers.

When Delphi entered bankruptcy reorganization in 2005, because it was self insured, insurance coverage for underlying workers compensation claims filed by employees were assumed by the state’s “self insured security fund” under Michigan law. MCL 418.537(1).  However, the state objected in the bankruptcy proceedings, and claimed that the insurers’ listing of “Delphi”, rather than the insured subsidiaries on the state-required notice forms bound the insurers to cover the claims, rather than the state of Michigan’s self-insured security fund.

When Delphi’s obligations were eventually discharged in bankruptcy, the insurers filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court (essentially the equivalent of a declaratory judgment action) asking the court to rule on the underlying issues regarding errant listing of the employer, Delphi, on the Michigan state workers compensation insurance notice forms.  While this was pending the director of Michigan’s Workers Compensation Agency scheduled a “Rule 5” hearing to determine whether the insurers were liable for the Delphi claims under the policies that had been issued to the subsidiary companies.

The bankruptcy court stayed the Rule 5 proceeding.  It determined it had jurisdiction to consider the underlying issue.  However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that while the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to consider the scope of coverage in the underlying insurance policies, it did not have jurisdiction to consider whether the insurers were nonetheless liable for filing the inaccurate forms in Michigan.

The insurers then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Michigan Court of Claims seeking determination of its coverage obligations under the policies for the Delphi claims.  The insurers argued that the policies controlled the obligation of coverage and not the errant listing of the wrong employer on the state-required forms.  The Court of Claims agreed and the state appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the inaccurate designation of Delphi on the state-required notice forms did not trump the contractual language in the insurance policies themselves, which underwrote and insured only the subsidiary company’s workers compensation obligations.  Liability for the workers’ compensation claims filed and/or to be filed by Delphi were not covered by the insurers’ policies, which had insured only the subsidiary companies.

This is an interesting and somewhat procedurally complex case, which addresses significant liabilities that, according to the holding, will be borne by the state of Michigan, rather than by the insurers.

However, the holding and the rationale is rather unremarkable.  The underlying insurance contracts control the coverage obligations vis-à-vis the listed insureds, not another party that was not underwritten for such coverage.

Read the case here:  Ace American, et al. v. Workers Compensation Agency Director, et al.

 

 

Court of Appeals Issues Ruling On Independent Contractor Case

The Michigan Court of Appeals issued its opinion in a case I briefed (92675_Moore_Appellant’s_Brief_313440.12.26.2013.1838)  and argued in the Court of Appeals last summer, ruling consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent disposition of workers compensation insurance coverage for subcontractors holding themselves out to be employers, while claiming to be employees.

The facts involved a workers compensation claimant who was hired to do a four-hour roofing job by the putative “employer”.  The claimant ran an independent roofing business, had other workers doing roofing work at another location, purchased workers compensation insurance, and otherwise held himself out to be a roofer doing roofing work.  He injured his foot while performing the four-hour job and sought workers compensation benefits from the company that had hired him to do that job.  Several iterations of a decision were rendered by the workers compensation board and the appellate commission.  The Court of Appeals granted my application for leave to appeal, and then, plaintiff’s cross-application on a wage-loss calculation issue (a very interesting issue in its own right but which is likely rendered moot by this finding that the claimant was not in fact an employee).

The coverage case involved several underlying insurance companies potentially covering the claim depending on the employment status of the claimant.  What is remarkable, among other interesting procedural twists and turns, is that two Judges on the panel I argued the case before were on opposite sides of the underlying issue in a Court of Appeals conflict panel opinion issued after the Court of Appeals convened a special conflict panel to address whether the language of MCL 418.161(1)(n) (pre-2011 amendments) was conjunctive or disjunctive, requiring satisfaction of all or only one of the “elements” listed to remove or, divest, a claimant of “employee” status under the Workers Disability Compensation Act.

That conflict panel decision by the Court of Appeals actually ruled against the arguments I forwarded in my brief, but as I predicted in the brief, and at oral argument, the Supreme Court was considering the conflict panel’s decision and was likely to overrule it, which they did, as I explained in this post:  Supreme Court Overrules Court of Appeals Decision Defining Employees for Purposes of Workers Compensation Entitlement

Thus, at oral argument, I made a full frontal assault on the conflict panel’s decision reading the statutory language as conjunctive (much to the satisfaction of Judge Borrello, who the Supreme Court ultimately sided with), and, as well, in my arguments section of the brief.

The Court also used my argument to counter the Appellate Commission’s unique (if not strained) reading of the meaning of the introductory phrase of the statute “in relation to this service” (my emphasis).  In its decision, the appellate commission reasoned that the phrase contained in MCL 418.161(1)(n) referred not to roofing in general, but roofing on behalf of the putative employer.  The Commission had stated that plaintiff did not maintain a separate business of roofing for this employer, nor was he hired by this employer in his capacity as a roofing contractor with a crew of workers. Rather, the Commission had stated plaintiff was hired by the putative employer as an individual worker.

As I argued in my brief, this reasoning was flawed because the statutory phrase “in relation to this service” refers to roofing in general. And, the Court of Appeals cites to the case I referred to, Reed v. Yackell, 473 Mich 520, 537 (2005), in which the Supreme Court had used the precise example factually relevant in this case, to wit, a roofer doing roofing work!  In other words, the Court of Appeals went on to reason, the phrase “in relation to this service” refers to the type of services performed, not the identity of the party receiving the services.

It was one of the more active panels that I have been before and they were extremely engaged in the issue and the outcome.  Read the decision here:  Moore Opinion

If you have any questions about this case and its impact on general liability and workers’ compensation insurance coverage determinations please call Carson J. Tucker, (734) 218-3605.

Employee Driving Company Truck to Job Site Not “In the Course and Scope of Employment” Under Workers Disability Compensation Act

The Court of Appeals (in a 2-1 majority opinion) issued a significant case yesterday, albeit unpublished, holding that an employee driving a company vehicle to a job site location in another part of the state was not “in the course and scope of his employment” when injured in a traffic accident while en route to the job site.

The Court of Appeals opinion is here:  Little, et al. v. Kappen Tree Service, et al. COA (1).

The Court of Appeals cites the general rule that ordinarily injuries received while employees are traveling to and from work are not compensable by the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance coverage because such injuries do not “arise out of and in the course of” employment within the meaning of the Michigan Workers Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101, et seq.  MCL 418.301 requires for an injury to be compensable it must both “arise out of” and occur “in the course of employment”.

The Court of Appeals reasons that the employee faced no special risks other than those faced by the ordinary commuter to and from work.

Judge Hoekstra dissents.  He reasons that the employee was performing a “dual purpose” and therefore an exception to the “going to and coming from” exclusion applied.   The “dual purpose” was the employee bringing another employee to the job site so that employee could drive another vehicle home the day of the accident.  Judge Hoekstra would have found that the employee was “in the course and scope of his employment” and therefore covered by workers compensation, rather than no-fault automobile liability insurance.

This is an important case given the many disputes between no-fault automobile liability insurers and employers and their workers’ compensation insurers when an accident occurs in a vehicle while the employee is traveling to or from work, or driving his or her vehicle during the work day.

If anyone has questions regarding this decision, please contact Carson J. Tucker, JD, MSEL at (734) 218-3605.

 

 

 

Michigan Supreme Court Reverses Court of Appeals Decision Forcing Workers Compensation Agencies to Remain Open at Certain Locations

The Michigan Supreme Court has reversed the Court of Appeals decision that held the Director of the Michigan Administrative Hearing System and the Director of the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs were required to maintain local offices for litigation of Workers’ Compensation Agency hearings.  Read the opinion here:

Younkin v. Zimmer

In September 2012, the Director of the MAHRS had announced new efforts to reorganize, including closing the Flint office that previously handled workers’ compensation claims and transferring those claims to an office in Dimondale, approximately 70 miles away.

The Plaintiff in the underlying case injured his back while at his job in Flint.  He filed a workers’ compensation claim.  Because of the reorganization, he was required to litigate his claim in Dimondale, rather than in the now-closed Flint office.

He filed a writ of mandamus in Circuit Court to compel the Directors to maintain the Genesee County (Flint) hearing site.  The circuit court issued the writ and the Directors appealed.  The Court of Appeals (M. J. KELLY, P.J., and FORT HOOD, J. (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting)), affirmed, holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion. 304 Mich App 719 (2014).

In a unanimous opinion released November 18, 2014, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Directors to hold workers compensation hearings in Flint.

MCL 418.851 provides that a workers’ compensation hearing must be held at the locality where the injury occurred. The Supreme Court reasoned Defendants, in their official capacities as administrators of the workers’ compensation hearing system, interpreted the term “locality” as meaning a district or a definite region. This interpretation was entitled to respectful consideration. Because it did not conflict with the Legislature’s intent, there were no cogent reasons to overrule it.

The Court continued, reasoning that in accordance with the Directors’ interpretation of the statute, they divided the state into 11 reasonably located hearing districts, and workers’ compensation claims were assigned from definite regions of the state to one of those hearing district offices depending on where the injury occurred.

Nothing in the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq., requires that there be a hearing site in every county. While the hearing should be held at a place convenient for parties and their witnesses, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the locality where the injury occurred in this case was Dimondale given the injury occurred in Genesee County and that county falls within the Dimondale district.

The Court concluded although having the hearing in the latter rather than in the former venue would doubtlessly be less convenient for plaintiff, this would not constitute an unreasonable inconvenience. Accordingly, plaintiff did not have a clear legal right to a hearing in Genesee county, and the Directors did not have a clear legal obligation to hold the hearing there.

I previously wrote about this case in an earlier blog here:

Court of Appeals Rules Workers Compensation Hearings Must Be Held in “Locality” Where Injury Occurred Forcing Directors of Administrative Hearing Systems to Reopen Closed Offices Throughout the State

Insurers and Businesses Should Always Consider What Options are Available for Insurance Coverage and Recovery of Insurance Assets When Facing a Dispute, Claim or Lawsuit

One of the most important ways insurance companies and businesses can manage their assets and control their liability is to think creatively about insurance and insuring agreements in managing their day-to-day business operations.  Disputes, claims, and yes, lawsuits often arise in the ordinary course of thriving and vibrant businesses.  This is a natural consequence of a successful business managing risk in the process of seeking to maximize profits.

As insurance coverage counsel, I regularly advise businesses and insurance companies as to their defense and indemnity obligations under commercial general liability, errors and omissions, and workers compensation insurance policies, among others.

I have assisted insurance companies and businesses by guiding them through various aspects of coverage, including initial assessment of coverage positions, preparation and drafting of coverage opinions, including preparing related correspondence to the insurers or insureds, and other parties involved, e.g., coverage denials, reservation of rights, etc., and pursuing, where appropriate, declaratory judgment and/or indemnity and subrogation actions with respect to coverage issues.

In this capacity, I have had several significant successes in both state and federal courts in securing judgments for businesses and insurance companies or in forcing agreeable settlements with insureds and other insurance companies.  Some of the cases and issues I have worked on include the following:

 

• Providing coverage analysis and primary litigation support in filing a declaratory judgment action filed in federal court for a major national retail store as to potential coverage and indemnification from an insurer under an “additional insured” provision in a vendor / supplier contract between the store and the manufacturer. I served as primary insurance coverage counsel for the store relating to the underlying case, which was a personal injury / product liability lawsuit against the store involving paralysis of a 15-year old.  The plaintiff jumped into shallow water from a water trampoline manufactured by a company that sold a variety of recreation products in the retailer’s stores throughout the country.  The manufacturer and the retailer had a vendor-supplier agreement in which the manufacturer agreed to add the retailer as an additional insured to its general liability insurance policies, and provide indemnity to it for liability arising out of use of its products.  The insurer had agreed to defend the retailer in the lawsuit in Michigan.    Lawsuits were pending against the manufacturer across the country for injuries suffered due to use of another one of its products.  The manufacturer filed for bankruptcy protection in the 8^th Circuit in Nebraska, after which the insurer pulled out of the defense of the retailer in Michigan.  I prepared a coverage opinion, concluding the insurer was obligated to continue defending the retailer, and I filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court in Michigan despite the bankruptcy stay.  I fended off attempts by the insurer to enforce the bankruptcy stay against the retailer in Michigan, won motions filed for contempt of the stay, and ultimately succeeded in forcing a settlement of the claim on behalf of the retailer for the total amount of the policy limits to which the retailer would have been entitled for coverage of the underlying claims.  This resulted in a $0 payout by the retailer in settlement of the underlying lawsuit in Michigan.

 

• Filing suit against an insurance company in federal court for denial of coverage of an underlying lawsuit involving a shooting at a gas station. The case is Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Al-Mashadi et al., 2009 WL 2711963.  While the underlying lawsuit was pending in circuit court, I filed the declaratory judgment action in federal court, drafted the summary judgment motion and brief, and argued there was no coverage for the underlying lawsuit and claim arising out of a shooting by an employee of one of his friends when the two were engaged in horseplay with a gun belonging to the gas station’s owner.  After arguing the motion, the district court granted the insurer summary judgment, ruling no coverage was owed by the insurance company in the underlying lawsuit.

 

• Providing emergency litigation and appeal response to a zoning dispute in which an international energy company sought to construct (and did construct) a meteorological testing antenna (MET) a “wind testing tower”, without a proper zoning variance from the insured township. The township’s Zoning Board of Appeals rejected the power company’s appeal for a variance and the power company sued the township.  I stepped in and filed several injunctive motions, including an emergency circuit court appeal to thwart the power company’s efforts to permit the tower to remain as constructed on the property.  The circuit court issued injunctive relief (including an order to tear down the fully constructed tower) and forced the power company to pick up the insurer’s legal fees.

 

• Preparing a coverage opinion and denial of coverage letter in a defective construction / defective product dispute under an occurrence based general liability policy (including products / completed operations hazards coverage). The insured, a cement company, filed suit against contractors and subcontractors, and a city, for failure to pay for delivery of cement.  The defendants filed a counter-suit under various theories and alleged the cement was defective, causing defects in and need for repair to the newly installed sidewalks.  In its ruling in the underlying suit, the trial court concluded the cement met specifications required by the contract and was therefore not defective.  A combination of factors led to the defective sidewalks, but not the delivery by the cement company of a defective product. The weight of authority provides that no “occurrence” arises from the provision of a non-defective product when the manufacturer of that product seeks coverage for damages alleged as the result of incorporation of its product into other work.  Since the insured provided a product that met the specifications required for the municipal sidewalk project there was no “occurrence” and therefore no coverage for the claims in the underlying lawsuit.

 

• Providing a “second look” coverage opinion where in-house coverage counsel concluded there was no coverage for business interruption losses as a result of a large stage collapse and resulting debris field on the floor of the Pontiac Silverdome during summer months when the Silverdome was rented out for various events. The insured supplied the staging, decking and truss grids for the event.  Contractors and subcontractors were employed to erect it.  I analyzed the applicable policy language and concluded coverage was owed on the precise risk involved.  The policy covered “property damage” which included the loss of use of property caused by an occurrence, even if that property had not itself been damaged.  Michigan courts have awarded consequential damages such as “delay damages”, “lost profits”, and “diminution in value and use”, in cases under commercial general liability policies with similar or identical language to the policies covering “occurrences” “because of” “property damage”.  As none of the “business risk” exclusions in the policy applied, and it appeared the stage collapse was not due to the fault of the subcontractors or contractors employed to erect the stage, coverage was arguably owed and the insurer had a duty to defend and potentially indemnify the owner of the Silverdome.

Feel free to call or contact me if your business would like to explore options regarding insurance coverage and recovery.

 

Insurance Carrier Covering Worker’s Initial Injury Wage-Loss Benefits May Apportion Liability for Wage-Loss Benefits With Insurance Carrier Covering Worker’s Second Disabling Injury Suffered While the Employee was Performing “Reasonable Employment” Work

In a published opinion after a remand order from the Michigan Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals has ruled that under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), an insurance carrier responsible for paying worker’s compensation (wage-loss benefits) for an employee’s initial disabling injury, may apportion its liability for wage-loss benefits with the insurance carrier covering the employee when he incurred a separate disabling injury, which was suffered by the employee during his performance of light-duty “reasonable employment” work as the result of the initial injury.

“[W]hen a partially disabled employee suffers another injury while performing reasonable employment” within the meaning of MCL 418.301(5), allocation among or reimbursement by and between insurance carriers separately covering the two risks may occur.  Slip Op. at 3.

After remand from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals holds that an insurance carrier originally covering an employee’s worker’s compensation benefits, and who was liable for wage-loss benefits based on an initial 1993 injury, and after the employee returned to reasonable employment, could not be stuck with 100 percent of the costs of covering the employee’s total wage-loss benefits based on his original wages, after the employee suffered a subsequent, totally disabling back injury in 1998 while covered by another insurance carrier and while working at a lower wage.

The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (the Commission) originally ruled that the initial insurance carrier, Pacific, was responsible for the total wage-loss benefits and could not offset or receive allocation from American (which insured the employee when he suffered a totally disabling 1998 back injury) based on the difference between the original wages and the lower reasonable-employment wages he was earning at the time of his second injury.

This is a significant decision because it answers a question left open by the Supreme Court’s opinion interpreting MCL 418.301(5) in Arnold v. GM, 456 Mich. 682 (1998), which generally confirmed that an employee suffering a disabling injury after returning to reasonable employment work was entitled to the wage-loss benefits based on his or her original wage at the time of the initial injury.

Arnold, as the COA points out here, did not address the situation present in the instant case concerning whether the carrier covering the risk during the initial injury, who is required by MCL 418.301(5) to pay benefits on the basis of the original wage, not the favored work wage, could seek apportionment and/or reimbursement if a second, subsequent carrier happened to be “on the risk” when the employee suffered a second, disabling injury while performing the reasonable work employment at a lower wage.

Here, instead of Pacific, the initial carrier, being liable for 100 percent of the wage-loss benefits for the employee based on the employee’s wages at the time of his 1993 injury, American, the subsequent carrier is required to pay Pacific a differential based on the wages being earned by the employee during the reasonable work employment and at the time of his second, totally disabling injury in 1998.

This creates a very important avenue in the relevant case to seek apportionment and reimbursement where a second, subsequent insurer is on the risk at the time an employee suffers a second, disabling injury while performing the reasonable employment work within the meaning of MCL 418.301(5) and MCL 418.301(5)(e).

As the COA panel notes in this opinion, general principles of worker’s compensation law require employers to pay only their share of an employee’s wage-loss during the time a partially disabled employee is earning post-injury wages.  The COA reasoned that even though MCL 418.301(5), nor the WDCA in general, contained explicit statutory  bases to apportion liability among carriers in this situation, the result would be unjust to require the initial carrier to pay 100 percent of the subsequent wage-loss benefits suffered as the result of the second, disabling injury suffered while the employee was covered by a subsequent workers’ compensation insurance carrier.

The opinion is attached here:  Nichols v. Howmet Corp., et al. (After Remand) (for Publication)

“Intentional Tort Exception” to Exclusive Remedy Provision of Workers Compensation Act Did Not Apply to Employee’s Claim of Injury by Allegedly Defective Machinery

Yesterday, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an order summarily reversing the published decision of the Court of Appeals in Thomai.v.MIBA Hydramechanica Corp., et al, 303 Mich. App. 196 (2013), a case in which the Court of Appeals allowed a circuit court suit to proceed against a manufacturer on the basis that the employee had sufficient basis to proceed under the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Michigan Workers’ Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq.

The plaintiff was injured while operating a machine at work.  The machine leaked oil onto the floor and workers were constantly required to wipe up the oil with rags to keep the floor and work area dry.  While cleaning up the oil, the plaintiff’s arm became trapped in the machine.  He filed suit in circuit court, which dismissed the action, citing MCL 418.131(1) (the “intentional tort” exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the WDCA).  The exclusive remedy in Michigan for workplace injuries is under the provisions of the WDCA.

In its published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute, as well as prior Supreme Court precedent, allows this exception to apply to “deliberate acts” by the employer that are shown to have occurred over a period of time. Here, the allegation is that the machine that injured the plaintiff was in disrepair and needed constant maintenance.  Since the employer knew about this, but did nothing about it, the act of the employer being deliberate could constitute the “intentional” act needed to bring the case out of the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA.

In its order, thomai.v.MIBA.order.reverse.coa, the Supreme Court notes the trial court gave the plaintiff sufficient time to prove the necessary elements of the intentional tort exception, and, after properly applying those elements to the facts that were in the record, properly dismissed the claim.  The Court therefore reverses the Court of Appeals’ decision noting:  “There is simply no evidence in the record to establish that the defendants wilfully disregarded knowledge that an injury was certain to occur to the plaintiff from his operation of the grooving machine.”

It is also worth noting, although the trial court did not dismiss on these grounds, that the Michigan Workers’ Compensation Agency has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over claims that should be filed under the WDCA, at least at the commencement of an action. On the basis of Michigan Constitutional authority of administrative agencies, as well as on the statutory jurisdiction of circuit courts, the question of compensation for injuries sustained by employees while at work resides exclusively within the purview of the workers’ compensation agency and the automatic benefits and remedies available under the WDCA.  If, during the course of discovery, it is determined that the “intentional tort” exception may apply, then, and only then, should a circuit court exercise jurisdiction over the claim.

For more than a century, Lacey & Jones has distinguished itself from other law firms by maintaining a robust Appeals and Legal Research Group.  Effective appellate representation demands different skills than those required by litigation attorneys.  Our appellate attorneys are adept at analyzing the intricacies of each case from an objective and critical perspective.  From reviewing and preparing the lower court record, identifying appealable errors, and developing a strategy to raise issues that will be addressed by appellate courts, our seasoned appellate team is capable of handling the most complex appeals from the application stage to oral advocacy before the highest courts.  Our research abilities and knowledge of current issues in nearly all major subject-matter areas of the law provide our clients with efficient and immediate assistance with complex and high-exposure cases.

We are experienced at navigating through all appellate courts to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and quickly ruled upon.

During the last three decades alone, the Appeals and Legal Research Group at Lacey & Jones has been responsible for over 150 published decisions, including seminal decisions in workers’ compensation, governmental immunity, employment and labor law, civil rights law and insurance coverage.  Because of its specialized knowledge and focus on appellate law and its recognized expertise, the Appeals and Legal Research Group at Lacey & Jones has been asked to participate as amicus curiae writing briefs for the Supreme Court or as special counsel to the Michigan Attorney General and other governmental entities in some of the most significant cases in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.   Below are some of the recent significant cases in which Lacey & Jones, LLP’s Appeals and Legal Research Group has participated.

• Arbuckle v. GM, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310611, oral argument in Court of Appeals presented May 2014 by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (201_), amicus curiae brief filed for Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Townships Association on June 16, 2014, after remand by Carson J. Tucker
• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated May 6, 2014 (Docket No. 313638), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker
• Omian v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 495 Mich. 859 (2013), application filed by Carson J. Tucker, Supreme Court remand to Court of Appeals on leave granted, oral argument to be held in July 2014
• Ghanam v. John Does, 303 Mich. App. 522 (2013), application to appeal filed in Supreme Court by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, ___ Mich App ___ (2013), amicus curiae for Oakland County in support of MMRMA application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ 201_), application granted, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (201_), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae for Oakland, Macomb and Wayne County filed by Carson J. Tucker in support of the state’s application
• Huddleston v. Trinity Health, et al., 495 Mich. 976 (2014), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae with Lawrence Garcia, Esq., for MDTC
• Ashley, LLC v Pittsfield Twp., 494 Mich 875 (2013), application granted, for Pittsfield Township by Carson J. Tucker (resolved by settlement)
• Bailey v. Schaaf, ___ Mich ___ (2013), amicus curiae for MDTC by Carson J. Tucker
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich 707 (2012), oral argument on application, Court of Appeals case reversed by opinion, Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• McMurtrie v Eaton Corp, 490 Mich 976 (2011)
• Findley v DaimlerChrysler Corp., 490 Mich 928 (2011)
• Brewer v. AD.Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich 50 (2010)
• Stokes v Chrysler, 481 Mich 266 (2008)
• Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269 (2008)
• Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics, 469 Mich 220 (2003)

Workers’ Compensation Cases Must Be Heard and Adjudicated in “Locality” Where Injury Occurred

In Younkin v Zimmer et al, a 2-1 published opinion by the Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed a trial court’s decision to issue a writ of mandamus requiring workers’ compensation claims to be heard in the locality where the injury occurred in accordance with MCL 418.851.  The majority holds that the Michigan Legislature “limited the geographic area within which a hearing on workers’ compensation claims may be held and that the transfer of the hearings to Dimondale exceeded that limitation.”  Slip Op. at 1.

In 2012, the Defendants, the executive director of the Michigan Administrative Hearing System and the director of the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA), sought to close the Flint district office of the workers’ compensation agency and transfer all workers’ compensation claims arising in Genesee County, including the plaintiff’s claim, from the Flint district office to the Dimondale district office, which is located within 70 miles of Genesee County.

Plaintiff worked for General Motors at its assembly plant in Flint. He injured his back while working and was determined to be totally and permanently disabled.  Plaintiff then filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits with the workers compensation office in Flint.

In 2012, Plaintiff filed a writ of mandamus action in circuit court to compel Defendants to comply with the Workers Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.301 et seq., and particularly, with MCL 418.851, which required all hearings on workers’ compensation claims to be held in the locality where the injury occurred.  Plaintiff sought mandamus to have the trial court require the Defendants to ensure that hearings on all cases arising out of injuries occurring in Genesee County be held in the locality of the injury as required by the statute.

Defendants argued the statute required only that the hearing be held in a place that is convenient for the parties and their witnesses.  Further Defendants argued that mandamus was not a proper remedy because they had discretion to make budgetary decisions to close unnecessary facilities and reassign magistrates.

The trial court ruled that Plaintiff (and all others similarly situated) had a legal right to have their workers’ compensation claims adjudicated in the locality where the injury occurred as required by the language of MCL 418.851.  The trial court also ordered that the Defendants “rescind the directive that cases arising out of Genesee County be transferred to a hearing site in Dimondale.”  Slip Op. at 3.

The Court of Appeals majority (M. J. Kelly, PJ, and Fort Hood) affirmed.  It first ruled the trial court had authority to issue a mandamus because the Plaintiff had a clear legal right to performance of the duties it sought to compel of the public officials, and the public officials had a concomitant “clear legal duty” to perform those acts arising out of those duties.

The Court reasoned Defendants, as the chief executives in charge of the Michigan administrative hearing system and LARA, have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring proper conduct of any administrative hearings held under the authority of the WDCA.

Interpreting the relevant statutory provision, MCL 418.851, which states, in pertinent part, “[t]he [workers’ compensation] hearing shall be held at the locality where the injury occurred”, the Court of Appeals concluded that there “could be no reasonable dispute that the Legislature’s use of the word “shall…plainly and unequivocally requires the magistrate to hold the hearing to resolve the dispute ‘at the locality where the injury occurred.'”  Slip Op. at 4.

Since it was undisputed that Plaintiff “sustained the injury giving rise to his workers’ compensation claim in Flint…the magistrate assigned to resolve any disputes concerning [Plaintiff’s] claim for workers’ compensation benefits must hold the hearings to resolve the disputes in the locality that includes Flint.”  Id. at 6.  The majority concluded “Dimondale is not sufficiently close to qualify as the ‘locality where the injury occurred.”  MCL 418.851.

The majority also held that the legislative directive “applies to all hearings to resolve disputes concerning a claimant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits.”  Id. at 8.

With MCL 418.851, the Legislature made a clear policy choice in favor of local hearings; it required magistrates to resolve disputes over workers’ compensation claims by holding a hearing “at the locality where the injury occurred.” MCL 418.851. Although the failure to hold such hearings at the locality will not “void” the result…that fact does not give magistrates the unfettered discretion to ignore the Legislature’s directive that the hearings be held in the locality where the injury occurred.  Claimants whose injuries occurred within Genesee County have a clear legal right to have disputes over their claims resolved at hearings held within that locality.  Similarly, [Defendants] had and have a clear legal duty to ensure that the magistrates who fall under their authority comply with MCL 418.851 and hold the hearings to resolve those disputes in the locality where the injury occurred.

Judge Cavanagh dissented, arguing that Defendants’ establishment of “reasonably located hearing district offices throughout the state which service definite regions of the state to particular hearing district offices” was entitled to “respectful consideration”.  Slip Op. at 2 (Cavanagh, dissenting).  He pointed out that although the majority interpreted the term “locality” in the statute to include the commonly understood term “region”, the majority narrowed the term to mean that “region” must be “the municipality where the injury occurred”.

Judge Cavanagh stated:

My conclusion is also cognizant of the fact that a “strong rationale” for the WDCA is to provide injured employees with “expeditious” relief.  Considering the realities of budgetary constraints and the limited number of magistrates, as well as the summary nature of worker’s compensation proceedings, requiring hearing locations in every community, neighborhood, or municipality would not only be extremely costly and unnecessary, but would defeat a significant purpose of the WDCA which is to provide expeditious relief to claimants. I agree with plaintiff’s argument that defendants cannot disregard their statutory duty because of a reduction in state funding.  However, I would conclude that defendants fulfilled their duty under MCL 418.851 by establishing reasonably located hearing district offices throughout the state which service definite regions of the state.

This 2-1 published Court of Appeals opinion is likely to cause significant enough controversy to warrant further attention.  The Defendants have until Tuesday, May 27 to file an Application for Leave to Appeal with the Supreme Court.

For more than a century, Lacey & Jones has distinguished itself from other law firms by maintaining a robust Appeals and Legal Research Group.  Effective appellate representation demands different skills than those required by litigation attorneys.  Our appellate attorneys are adept at analyzing the intricacies of each case from an objective and critical perspective.  From reviewing and preparing the lower court record, identifying appealable errors, and developing a strategy to raise issues that will be addressed by appellate courts, our seasoned appellate team is capable of handling the most complex appeals from the application stage to oral advocacy before the highest courts.  Our research abilities and knowledge of current issues in nearly all major subject-matter areas of the law provide our clients with efficient and immediate assistance with complex and high-exposure cases.

We are experienced at navigating through all appellate courts to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and quickly ruled upon.

During the last three decades alone, the Appeals and Legal Research Group at Lacey & Jones has been responsible for over 150 published decisions, including seminal decisions in workers’ compensation, governmental immunity, employment and labor law, civil rights law and insurance coverage.  Because of its specialized knowledge and focus on appellate law and its recognized expertise, the Appeals and Legal Research Group at Lacey & Jones has been asked to participate as amicus curiae writing briefs for the Supreme Court or as special counsel to the Michigan Attorney General and other governmental entities in some of the most significant cases in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.   Below are some of the recent significant cases in which Lacey & Jones, LLP’s Appeals and Legal Research Group has participated.

• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County (Court of Appeals Docket No. 313638 (May 6, 2014)
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (201_), amicus curiae brief to be filed after remand for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Omian v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 495 Mich. 859 (2013), application filed by Carson J. Tucker, Supreme Court remand to Court of Appeals on leave granted
• Ghanam v. John Does, 303 Mich. App. 522 (2013), application to appeal filed in Supreme Court by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, ___ Mich App ___ (2013), amicus curiae for Oakland County in support of MMRMA application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ 201_), application granted, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (201_), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae for Oakland, Macomb and Wayne County filed by Carson J. Tucker in support of the state’s application
• Huddleston v. Trinity Health, et al., 495 Mich. 976 (2014), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae with Lawrence Garcia, Esq., for MDTC
• Ashley, LLC v Pittsfield Twp., 494 Mich 875 (2013), application granted, for Pittsfield Township by Carson J. Tucker (resolved by settlement)
• Bailey v. Schaaf, ___ Mich ___ (2013), amicus curiae for MDTC by Carson J. Tucker
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich 707 (2012), oral argument on application, Court of Appeals case reversed by opinion, Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• McMurtrie v Eaton Corp, 490 Mich 976 (2011)
• Findley v DaimlerChrysler Corp., 490 Mich 928 (2011)
• Brewer v. AD.Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich 50 (2010)
• Stokes v Chrysler, 481 Mich 266 (2008)
• Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269 (2008)
• Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics, 469 Mich 220 (2003)

Lego v. Liss – State Files Appeal in Governmental Immunity Case Involving “Friendly Fire” Incident

Last week, the state of Michigan filed an Application for Leave to Appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court challenging the Court of Appeals (majority) opinion in this case Lego v. Liss, holding that a police officer could be subject to liability (and not immune) in an incident in which the officer shot another police officer while conducting an arrest.

This ruling threatens the balance of immunity provided to law enforcement officers in the performance of their duty and runs contrary to the Governmental Tort Liability Act’s recognition that injuries incurred in the line of duty are inherent risks of policing.  See generally, MCL 691.1401 et seq.

The decision also “excepts” the plaintiff’s claim from the exclusive remedy provisions of the Michigan workers’ compensation disability act on grounds that a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant state trooper’s conduct was sufficiently reckless to come within the “intentional tort” exception to the exclusive remedy provision in MCL 418.131.

Carson J. Tucker represents governmental entities and law enforcement officers.  He is responsible for the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Odom v. Wayne County, a case in which he succeeded in having the Supreme Court grant leave to clarify the law after more than 30 years of disarray involving liability imposed on law enforcement officers for conduct in the line of duty.

Odom v. Wayne County – Supreme Court Issues Definitive Ruling on Intentional Tort Exception to Governmental Immunity

Effective appellate representation demands different skills than those required by litigation attorneys.  Mr. Tucker is adept at analyzing the intricacies of each case from an objective and critical perspective.  From reviewing and preparing the lower court record, identifying appealable errors, and developing a strategy to raise issues that will be addressed by appellate courts, Mr. Tucker is capable of handling the most complex appeals from the application stage to oral advocacy before the highest courts.  Mr. Tucker’s research abilities and knowledge of current issues in nearly all major subject-matter areas of the law provide our clients with efficient and immediate assistance with complex and high-exposure cases.

Mr. Tucker is experienced at navigating through all appellate courts to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and quickly ruled upon.

During the  7 years, Mr. Tucker has been responsible for several seminal decisions in workers’ compensation, governmental immunity, employment and labor law, civil rights law and insurance coverage.  Because of his specialized knowledge and focus on appellate law and his recognized expertise, Mr. Tucker has been asked to participate as amicus curiae writing briefs for the Supreme Court or as special counsel to other governmental entities in some of the most significant cases in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.

Some of the recent significant cases in which Mr. Tucker has provided direct appellate counsel include:

• Williamson v. GM, Supreme Court No. 149850 (November 25, 2014), application filed and Supreme Court granted
• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County (Court of Appeals Docket No. 313638 (May 6, 2014)
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (201_), amicus curiae brief to be filed after remand for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Omian v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 495 Mich. 859 (2013), application filed by Carson J. Tucker, Supreme Court remand to Court of Appeals on leave granted, oral argument presented by Carson J. Tucker.
• Ghanam v. John Does, 303 Mich. App. 522 (2013), application to appeal filed in Supreme Court by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, ___ Mich App ___ (2013), amicus curiae for Oakland County in support of MMRMA application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ 201_), application granted, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (201_), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae for Oakland, Macomb and Wayne County filed by Carson J. Tucker in support of the state’s application
• Huddleston v. Trinity Health, et al., 495 Mich. 976 (2014), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae with Lawrence Garcia, Esq., for MDTC
• Ashley, LLC v Pittsfield Twp., 494 Mich 875 (2013), application granted, for Pittsfield Township by Carson J. Tucker (resolved by settlement)
• Bailey v. Schaaf, ___ Mich ___ (2013), amicus curiae for MDTC by Carson J. Tucker
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich 707 (2012), oral argument on application, Court of Appeals case reversed by opinion, Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker