Court of Appeals Issues Ruling On Independent Contractor Case

The Michigan Court of Appeals issued its opinion in a case I briefed (92675_Moore_Appellant’s_Brief_313440.12.26.2013.1838)  and argued in the Court of Appeals last summer, ruling consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent disposition of workers compensation insurance coverage for subcontractors holding themselves out to be employers, while claiming to be employees.

The facts involved a workers compensation claimant who was hired to do a four-hour roofing job by the putative “employer”.  The claimant ran an independent roofing business, had other workers doing roofing work at another location, purchased workers compensation insurance, and otherwise held himself out to be a roofer doing roofing work.  He injured his foot while performing the four-hour job and sought workers compensation benefits from the company that had hired him to do that job.  Several iterations of a decision were rendered by the workers compensation board and the appellate commission.  The Court of Appeals granted my application for leave to appeal, and then, plaintiff’s cross-application on a wage-loss calculation issue (a very interesting issue in its own right but which is likely rendered moot by this finding that the claimant was not in fact an employee).

The coverage case involved several underlying insurance companies potentially covering the claim depending on the employment status of the claimant.  What is remarkable, among other interesting procedural twists and turns, is that two Judges on the panel I argued the case before were on opposite sides of the underlying issue in a Court of Appeals conflict panel opinion issued after the Court of Appeals convened a special conflict panel to address whether the language of MCL 418.161(1)(n) (pre-2011 amendments) was conjunctive or disjunctive, requiring satisfaction of all or only one of the “elements” listed to remove or, divest, a claimant of “employee” status under the Workers Disability Compensation Act.

That conflict panel decision by the Court of Appeals actually ruled against the arguments I forwarded in my brief, but as I predicted in the brief, and at oral argument, the Supreme Court was considering the conflict panel’s decision and was likely to overrule it, which they did, as I explained in this post:  Supreme Court Overrules Court of Appeals Decision Defining Employees for Purposes of Workers Compensation Entitlement

Thus, at oral argument, I made a full frontal assault on the conflict panel’s decision reading the statutory language as conjunctive (much to the satisfaction of Judge Borrello, who the Supreme Court ultimately sided with), and, as well, in my arguments section of the brief.

The Court also used my argument to counter the Appellate Commission’s unique (if not strained) reading of the meaning of the introductory phrase of the statute “in relation to this service” (my emphasis).  In its decision, the appellate commission reasoned that the phrase contained in MCL 418.161(1)(n) referred not to roofing in general, but roofing on behalf of the putative employer.  The Commission had stated that plaintiff did not maintain a separate business of roofing for this employer, nor was he hired by this employer in his capacity as a roofing contractor with a crew of workers. Rather, the Commission had stated plaintiff was hired by the putative employer as an individual worker.

As I argued in my brief, this reasoning was flawed because the statutory phrase “in relation to this service” refers to roofing in general. And, the Court of Appeals cites to the case I referred to, Reed v. Yackell, 473 Mich 520, 537 (2005), in which the Supreme Court had used the precise example factually relevant in this case, to wit, a roofer doing roofing work!  In other words, the Court of Appeals went on to reason, the phrase “in relation to this service” refers to the type of services performed, not the identity of the party receiving the services.

It was one of the more active panels that I have been before and they were extremely engaged in the issue and the outcome.  Read the decision here:  Moore Opinion

If you have any questions about this case and its impact on general liability and workers’ compensation insurance coverage determinations please call Carson J. Tucker, (734) 218-3605.

Court Holds “Bodily Injury” Damages Include “Pain and Suffering” and “Non-economic Damages” In “Motor Vehicle” Accident Claims Against Government

I previously wrote a short post about this case, but since I authored an amicus curiae brief for Michigan Townships Association, and the counties of Oakland, Wayne and Macomb, I have engaged in a bit more analysis.

The Supreme Court released its long awaited opinion in Hannay v. MDOT and Hunter v. Sisco, on December 19.

The underlying facts in both cases arose from motor vehicle accidents in which government owned vehicles were involved.  In Hannay, the plaintiff was injured when she was involved in an accident with a snowplow owned and operated by the Michigan Department of Transportation.  In Hunter the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was struck by a dump truck owned and operated by the City of Flint.

Both plaintiffs sued, claiming they suffered bodily injury and economic damages and were entitled to tort damages in excess of the minimum benefits available to all individuals injured by the operation, use or maintenance of a motor vehicle under Michigan’s No-Fault Automobile Insurance Law (the No-Fault Act), Compiled Laws, MCL 500.3101 et seq. However, for those injured by ownership or operation of a government-owned vehicle, the additional layer of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (the GTLA) (Compiled Laws, MCL 691.1401 et seq.) limits a person’s causes of action and recovery of damages to the more narrowly construed confines of the “motor vehicle” exception to governmental immunity.  See MCL 691.1405.  Under this latter provision, a person injured by the negligent operation of a government-owned motor vehicle may only recover “bodily injury” and “property” damages.

The main issue in these cases addressed an apparent conflict in the law from the two separate opinions issued by the Court of Appeals.  In Hunter v. Sisco, the Court of Appeals ruled that a person may not recover noneconomic tort damages that are available to claimants under the No-Fault Act when filing a claim against the government under the motor vehicle exception.  Since that exception only allowed recovery for “bodily injury” and “property” damage, and since the courts have construed the provision narrowly, recoverable damages were limited to those associated only with the physical injury to the person, i.e., medical expense damages.  Thus, “pain and suffering” and “emotional distress” damages that are ordinarily recoverable in a tort action under the No-Fault Act were not available under the GTLA in actions against the government under the motor vehicle exception to immunity.

In Hannay v. MDOT, the Court of Appeals ruled that a person could claim excess tort damages (in that case excess economic benefits damages like wage loss and lost earning potential).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s award for lost wages and for lost future potential earnings damages because the plaintiff had claimed that she was prevented from completing her education to become a dental hygienist.

Since both cases were published, and both rulings came to opposite conclusions about the extent and scope of recovery of damages under the motor vehicle exception of the GTLA, there was a conflict in the law.

Applications to appeal to the Supreme Court were filed in both cases.  The Supreme Court initially denied the application in the Hunter case.  It granted the State’s application in the Hannay case, and then subsequently granted a motion for reconsideration in the Hunter case after it became evident that resolution of both cases was necessary to address the fundamental underlying issues.

The Supreme Court’s opinion, joined by all of the Justices, with Justice Cavanagh concurring in the result only, is surprising in many respects.  Although the Supreme Court has for the better part of 40 years narrowly construed the exceptions to governmental immunity to include only those damages clearly identified as available to claimants under the GTLA in actions against the government, this principle of interpretation does not control the Court’s disposition of the result in this case.  Rather, the Court reasons that since the common-law definition of the term “bodily injury” prior to the 1964 passage of the comprehensive GTLA included pain and suffering and noneconomic damages for the claimant, and since the common law had not been explicitly overruled by the Legislature in its passage of the GTLA, the term continued to mean that such damages are recoverable to claimants.

Thus, the “tort damages” available to individual claimants under the No-Fault Act are also available to claimants who can prove such injuries and damages in actions against the government.

The Court comes to this conclusion despite very recent enunciations concerning the prioritization of the Legislature’s primary authority to define the law even in the face of prior judicial interpretations of the law, i.e., common law made by the decisions of the Supreme Court.  Further, the Court has also clearly indicated for decades that the GTLA requires even greater deference to the Legislature because it alone is the expression of the People’s will to be haled into court and answer for claims against the government.  Indeed, the Court has repeatedly stated that private and government actors are treated differently when addressing claims against them.

The Court’s opinion also does not address how the government can ever be held to the same standards and duties of an ordinary civilian under the auspices of the No-Fault Act.  The No-Fault Act provides that all Michigan citizens are responsible to provide primary no-fault benefits without regard to fault.  The GTLA requires a showing of fault, i.e., negligence, against the government in order for a claimant to be able to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts and to be entitled to damages.  Even though the No-Fault Act does provide for “tort damages” when a claimant can prove they suffered a “threshold injury”, i.e., an injury that causes serious impairment of a body function, this does not explain how and why the government must be subject to the same system applicable to other citizens in Michigan.  Another principle that the Supreme Court has adhered to since the beginning of statehood in Michigan, at least until now, is that the immunity of the government is jurisdictional.  Thus, litigation and liability can only be pursued via those means expressly defined by the Legislature as allowing suits against the government.  Otherwise, there is no consent, implicit or otherwise, to subject to the government, i.e., the People, to other liability and “no-fault” schemes under Michigan law.

Although this issue was not directly implicated in these cases, the failure to address it and answer the question in explaining that the government can indeed be held liable in the same parameters of liability and fault as ordinary citizens under the No-Fault Act blemishes an otherwise fairly visible and consistent image in the tapestry of jurisprudence created by the Court when addressing governmental liability in Michigan.

It is unfortunate that this opinion contains this evident erosion of the Court’s prior jurisprudence interpreting the GTLA.  It does not solidly adhere to the Court’s previously consistent themes in addressing governmental immunity cases post-1964 passage of the GTLA.  Because the term “bodily injury” exists in other exceptions to governmental immunity, this opinion will provide an opportunity for those seeking to expand the narrowly construed exceptions to the government’s liability.  It will also lead to additional and more strenuous litigation efforts against the government.  And, it will result in larger payouts by the government for damages claims under the GTLA, whether through settlements or judgments.

On that latter note, the one bright spot in the opinion is that the Court reverses the Court of Appeals affirmation in Hannay of the trial court’s allowance of speculative “future earnings potential” damages.  As mentioned, the Plaintiff claimed entitlement to future earnings as a dental hygienist, even though she never finished her educational certification for that particular job.  The trial court held that but for the motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff would have been accepted into a “dental-hygienist” program, would have graduated from that program, and would have been employed at least 60% of the time at the rate of $28 per hour.  The Court reasoned the damages award was far too speculative.  The plaintiff did not prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that she would have earned such wages if not for the accident.  “The number of conditions that had to be satisfied before Hannay could have been employed as a dental hygienist indicated that this case involved more than the inherent uncertainty of work-loss claims in general, rendering the award impermissibly contingent and speculative.”   Syllabus, and Slip. Op. at p. 38.

I continue to diligently monitor this and all other cases touching on the government’s liability and exposure under the exceptions to the GTLA.  It is unfortunate that this particular case appears to be a setback in the otherwise strong opinions issued by the Court in the past decade when addressing actions against the government.

My earlier posts about these cases can be found at the following links:

Supreme Court to Address Scope of Damages Available in Actions Against Governmental Entities Under No-Fault Insurance and Governmental Immunity Law

Governmental Liability for Damages Under Motor Vehicle Exception to Immunity to be Addressed by Supreme Court

Michigan Supreme Court to Consider Both Non-economic and Economic Tort Damages Claims Against Government

Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Brief Filed in Support of State’s Appeal in Motor Vehicle Exception Case

I have been directly involved in at least four cases as the government’s appellate attorney (Odom v. Wayne County, Hamed v. Wayne County, Atkins v. SMART Bus, and the Court of Appeals opinions in Gentry v. Wayne County and Truett v. Wayne County), and tangentially involved writing as amicus curiae in many others, which have demonstrated and continued the trend the government and its individual actors should be protected to a great degree to allow the smooth and uninterrupted operation of government affairs in day-to-day life.  I continue to believe that unnecessary litigation and large damages claims are inconsistent with this.  The Michigan Supreme Court’s decisions, which I secured in Odom, Hamed, and Atkins, as well as the Court of Appeals opinions in Gentry and Truett, were instrumental in advancing this overarching theme that should be the focus of those defending actions against the government.

If anyone has questions about any of these opinions, please call the Law Offices of Carson J. Tucker.

Effective appellate representation demands different skills than those required by litigation attorneys.  Mr. Tucker is adept at analyzing the intricacies of each case from an objective and critical perspective.  From reviewing and preparing the lower court record, identifying appealable errors, and developing a strategy to raise issues that will be addressed by appellate courts, Mr. Tucker is capable of handling the most complex appeals from the application stage to oral advocacy before the highest courts.

Mr. Tucker’s research abilities and knowledge of current issues in nearly all major subject-matter areas of the law provides his clients with efficient and immediate assistance with complex and high-exposure cases.

Mr. Tucker is experienced at navigating through all appellate courts to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and quickly ruled upon.

During the past decade, Mr. Tucker has been responsible for several seminal decisions in workers’ compensation, governmental immunity, employment and labor law, civil rights law and insurance coverage.

Because of his specialized knowledge and focus on appellate law and his recognized expertise, Mr. Tucker has been asked to participate as amicus curiae writing briefs for the Supreme Court or as special counsel to other governmental entities in some of the most significant cases in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.

Mr. Tucker presented direct representation to the defendants and prosecuted the entire appeal, including all appellate briefings and oral arguments before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the following cases, among others:

• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated May 6, 2014 (Docket No. 313638), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker for Wayne County
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich. 707 (August 20, 2012), application granted, and briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Supreme Court
• Gentry v. Wayne County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Carmona, unpublished opinion of hte Michigan Court of Appeals, dated October 11, 2011 (Docket No. 296580), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Court of Appeals
• Hamed v. Wayne County, 490 Mich. 1 (July 29, 2011), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
• Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459 (December 30, 2008), application for leave to appeal granted, and briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Supreme Court

Mr. Tucker has also served as special appellate counsel for governmental entities and organizations in writing amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in the following cases, among others:

• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich. ___ (December 19, 2014), application granted, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (2014), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae for Oakland, Macomb and Wayne County filed by Carson J. Tucker in support of the state’s application
• Ashley, LLC v Pittsfield Twp., 494 Mich 875 (2013), application granted, for Pittsfield Township by Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v. Manistee County Road Commission, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker

Mr. Tucker can be reached at +17342183605.

Court Holds “Bodily Injury” Damages Include “Pain and Suffering” and “Non-economic Damages” In “Motor Vehicle” Accident Claims Against Government

In a much awaited opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that a claimant may recover “nonecconomic damages” such as “pain and suffering” and “emotional distress” damages and excess “economic damages” in actions against the government under the “motor vehicle” exception to governmental immunity.

Two lower appellate court cases came to opposite conclusions about whether the term “bodily injury” in the motor vehicle exception, Compiled Laws (MCL) 691.1405, including such excess economic and traditional, tort “noneconomic” damages.

Before this opinion, the Governmental Liability Act (GTLA) had been construed narrowly to the strictest confines of the definition of terminology used in that act.  However, the Court here rules that because the common law jurisprudential definition of the term “bodily injury” had traditionally included these types of damage claims, and because the Legislature never explicitly reined in that definition, even after passage of the 1964 GTLA, the statutory term as used in the “motor vehicle” exception, and, likely in other sections of the GTLA will make such damages available to the claimant in actions against the government.

Read the opinion here:  Hannay-Hunter Opinion Supreme Court

I submitted an amicus curiae brief in the Michigan Supreme Court calendar session on this case for Michigan Townships Association and the counties of Macomb, Oakland and Wayne.  (99705-sc-amicus-curiae-br).

I also participated in a panel discussion about this case at the State Bar Negligence Law Section meeting in September.

Read more extensively about this case, including the lower appellate court opinions in my previous post, here:

http://amicus-curious.com/2014/09/22/supreme-court-to-address-interplay-if-any-between-the-no-fault-act-and-the-governmental-tort-liability-act/

If anyone has questions about this case and its impact, please let me know.

Employee Driving Company Truck to Job Site Not “In the Course and Scope of Employment” Under Workers Disability Compensation Act

The Court of Appeals (in a 2-1 majority opinion) issued a significant case yesterday, albeit unpublished, holding that an employee driving a company vehicle to a job site location in another part of the state was not “in the course and scope of his employment” when injured in a traffic accident while en route to the job site.

The Court of Appeals opinion is here:  Little, et al. v. Kappen Tree Service, et al. COA (1).

The Court of Appeals cites the general rule that ordinarily injuries received while employees are traveling to and from work are not compensable by the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance coverage because such injuries do not “arise out of and in the course of” employment within the meaning of the Michigan Workers Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101, et seq.  MCL 418.301 requires for an injury to be compensable it must both “arise out of” and occur “in the course of employment”.

The Court of Appeals reasons that the employee faced no special risks other than those faced by the ordinary commuter to and from work.

Judge Hoekstra dissents.  He reasons that the employee was performing a “dual purpose” and therefore an exception to the “going to and coming from” exclusion applied.   The “dual purpose” was the employee bringing another employee to the job site so that employee could drive another vehicle home the day of the accident.  Judge Hoekstra would have found that the employee was “in the course and scope of his employment” and therefore covered by workers compensation, rather than no-fault automobile liability insurance.

This is an important case given the many disputes between no-fault automobile liability insurers and employers and their workers’ compensation insurers when an accident occurs in a vehicle while the employee is traveling to or from work, or driving his or her vehicle during the work day.

If anyone has questions regarding this decision, please contact Carson J. Tucker, JD, MSEL at (734) 218-3605.

 

 

 

Missing Pane of Glass from Public Bus Shelter Not a Defective or Dangerous Condition Sufficient to State Cause of Action Against Public Bus Authority Under “Public Building” Exception to Governmental Immunity

The Summary Disposition Standard Debate

This case highlights a current conflict among the Court of Appeals.  There is a current “debate” among Court of Appeals panels in recent opinions about the sufficiency of pleading a cause of action against the government when assessing the government’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), which provides for “[e]ntry of judgment, dismissal of the action, or other relief because of…immunity granted by law”.  There is also debate about the extent to which sufficiently pled allegations, without more, can survive a summary disposition motion brought under this court rule pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), and the respective exceptions to governmental immunity being pled by the plaintiff in a given case.

Is it sufficient for a plaintiff to merely plead allegations that, if true, but not proved, would be sufficient to survive a motion for summary disposition filed by the government under MCR 2.116(C)(7)?  Should the trial court decide the factual question before allowing the case to go forward against the government?  Or, should the question be left to a jury (which of course means the case goes to trial)?

Hubbert v. SMART

This is a rather unremarkable case in terms of the outcome, but the majority and dissenting opinions are worth noting for several points.  The plaintiff was injured when he fell through a missing pane of glass on a public bus stop.  Plaintiff filed suit against the public bus authority seeking damages and claiming negligence.

The plaintiff never pled allegations in avoidance of immunity, i.e., never pled that the facts established his case fit with one of the five statutory exceptions to governmental immunity.  In fact, the plaintiff never acknowledged that governmental immunity applied.

The governmental defendant (the public bus authority), included “immunity” in its affirmative defense, and simply conceded the “public building” exception to governmental immunity was the exception under which the plaintiff had to bring her cause of action.  Public bus stops are considered “public buildings” within the meaning of MCL 691.1406 of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) (the “public building” exception).  Ali v. City of Detroit, 218 Mich. App. 581, 585 (1996).

The bus authority filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8) and (C)(10), contending that the public building exception did not apply because the missing pane of glass did not constitute a “dangerous or defective condition” within the meaning of the public building exception.

Plaintiff argued there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the missing pane of glass was a “dangerous or defective condition”, and that this was a sufficient question to allow the action to proceed to a jury for consideration.  The trial court agreed and denied the bus authority’s motion.  Pursuant to Michigan Court Rules (MCR) 7.203(A)(1) and MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v), denial of a governmental entity’s motion for summary disposition on immunity grounds under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appealable by right.

The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 opinion reversed ordering judgment for the bus authority.  The Court reasoned that, as a matter of law, the missing pane of glass was not a “dangerous or defective” condition within the meaning of the public building exception.

Applying the MCR 2.116(C)(7) Standard –  “Immunity Granted by Law”

Even though the bus authority sought summary disposition under the standards applicable to such motions under all three court rules MCR 2.116(C)(7) (“immunity granted by law”); (C)(8) (“failure to plead or state a claim”); and (C)(10) (“no genuine issue of material fact”), the Court of Appeals majority properly oriented the motion as one falling under (C)(7).

Thus, the Court reasoned, that summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when a claim is barred by “immunity granted by law”.  Slip Op. at 2-3.  (emphasis added), citing Seldon v. SMART, 297 Mich. App. 427, 432 (2012).  The Court pointed out that the trial court is to resolve the governmental immunity issue at the summary disposition stage as “an issue of law”, “[i]f there are no material facts in dispute or if reasonable minds could not differ regarding the legal effect of the facts.”  Id., citing Norris v. Lincoln Park Police Officers, 292 Mich. App. 574, 578 (2011).

This is not an insignificant detail.  The jurisdictional view of governmental immunity adhered to in Michigan requires that for a circuit court to even have subject-matter jurisdiction over a cause of action filed against the government, the case itself (the underlying facts of the case) must establish that the claim against the government can go forward under one of the legislative exceptions to immunity in the GTLA.  Greenfield Construction Co. v. State Highway Dep’t., 402 Mich. 172, 194 (1978) (stating that “it is well settled that the circuit court is without jurisdiction to entertain an action against the State of Michigan unless that jurisdiction shall have been acquired  by legislative consent).  See also Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567 (1984) and Manion v. State Highway Comm’r., 303 Mich. 1 (1942).  As the Supreme Court has recognized: “the state created the courts and so is not subject to them” or their jurisdiction absent explicit legislative consent.  County Road Ass’n of Michigan v. Governor, 287 Mich. App. 95, 118 (2010), citing Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 681 (2002).

Such consent comes only in the form of the narrowly applied exceptions to that immunity in the GTLA.  In re Bradley’s Estate, 494 Mich. 367, 389 (2013) (to state a claim for “tort liability” against the government, the only avenue to impose such liability and access any available remedy is through and under the provisions of the GTLA).  Only when the claimant pleads that the facts fall within an exception and proves the facts exist is there evidence of a waiver of the inherent and preexisting immunity granted by law.  Mack v. City of Detroit, 467 Mich. 186, 200-202 (2002) (a plaintiff pleads in avoidance of immunity by stating a claim that fits within a statutory exception).  And, later, the Court in a case I successfully briefed and argued, made clear that, at least with respect to actions against governmental entities, the burden of proof to both plead and prove the case falls within an exception is on the claimant at the outset.  Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459 (2008).

In this case, the Court of Appeals properly notes that the governmental immunity issue must be addressed at the summary disposition stage and as a “question of law”.  This properly orients the the preexisting and inherent characteristic of the government’s immunity.  As the Supreme Court has noted on more than one occasion, the government is immune from suit, not just liability, and if it has to expend its resources defending lawsuits all the way to the stage of the case reaching a jury, or a trial judge’s verdict, then immunity will be meaningless.  The government cannot be burdened with the expense of full-scale litigation in every case where a plaintiff merely recites allegations that, if true, would constitute a claim within an exception to immunity.

Conflict in Treatment of Governmental Immunity Motions Under MCR 2.116(C)(7)

Yet, the Court of Appeals is not consistent on this point.  In Kincaid v. Cardwell, 300 Mich. App. 513, 522 (2013), the Court of Appeals noted that where a fact question existed involving application of a bar to suit under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the question had to be submitted to a jury.

More recently, in Yono.v.MDOT.After.Remand.opn (Yono v. Michigan Dep’t of Transportation, Court of Appeals No. 308968 (released September 23, 2014)), the Court of Appeals, while recognizing the conflict of opinions in this area, conflated the (C)(7) standard with the “genuine issue of material fact” standard of (C)(10), as if there was no difference in application of these two court rules when assessing a motion for summary disposition.  This led to the result that a pled (but not necessarily proved) genuine issue of material fact (or a fact dispute) was sufficient to survive the summary disposition stage, even in a case against the government, which then leads to the case being submitted to the finder of fact.

This is error.  If this is the standard, then any well-pled allegation in a complaint setting for the parameters of an exception to immunity, and the factual allegations sufficient to fall within the exception will survive a motion for summary disposition on grounds of “immunity granted by law” under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

The Court of Appeals in this case got it right.  The trial court should decide the question “as a matter of law”.  In such cases, either party has an appeal by right to challenge the merits of the decision in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals has de novo reviewing authority over the case to check the trial court’s decision.

Otherwise, trial courts have the discretion to allow a case to proceed against the government, which is inconsistent with the jurisdictional view of governmental immunity and contrary to established case law, which preserves the government’s preexisting and inherent immunity from suit and liability in all but a small subset of narrowly applied circumstances.

Here is the Court of Appeals opinion:  hubbert v smart maj.OPN

And, the dissent:  hubbert v. smart .krause.dissent.OPN

Special Appellate Counsel for Emergency Appeals in State and Federal Court of Appeals and Supreme Court

It is the eve of trial.  The trial court judge, bent on forcing you into an unsavory settlement with opposing counsel, has granted opposing counsel’s motion in limine to exclude your proposed evidence from the jury’s consideration.  This is a key part of your client’s case and without it your client may be facing 100 percent of the responsibility for the damages alleged as a result of the significant allegations in the underlying lawsuit.  Sound familiar?

Is there a way to even the playing field, or, even better, to have the trial court’s errant legal rulings on the motion corrected?  Or, do you simply capitulate?

There is still hope.  And it can be done, even during the trial.

Carson J. Tucker specializes in prosecuting high-stakes, last-minute emergency appeals seeking interlocutory review of suspect legal rulings.  After all, if the trial court is wrong, or even if the Court of Appeals agrees to take a closer look, this can significantly alter the posture of the parties to the lawsuit.

I am experienced and adept at navigating through the Michigan Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and ruled upon as soon as possible.

In most cases, these actions have stopped the trial from immediately proceeding.  In many of the cases handled by Mr. Tucker, these actions have even resulted in the creation of precedent from the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court that changes the entire make-up of the pending lawsuit.  In the least, this type of action can properly re-orient the parties positions and attitudes with respect to settlement demands.

With adept and efficient appellate counsel ready to assist at a moment’s notice, your case can be quickly analyzed by objective review of the facts of the case, the strengths and weaknesses of the legal issues being addressed, and the potential for success at the appellate level.  It’s never too late to act until your case is submitted!

I have real stories and experiences to share from lawsuits in which our clients and the other law firms we have assisted have been able to save thousands of dollars in litigation costs and, more importantly, in damages awards or forced verdicts because I have been able to step in and make new law, or at least bring the parties together to discuss realistic settlement options.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you are contemplating an appeal, any appeal.

Mention of a Non-Party in Affirmative Defense Insufficient to Toll Statute of Limitations as to that Non-Party

In a published decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that mention of a potentially responsible non-party at fault in a class action suit was insufficient as a notice of non-party at fault within the meaning of Michigan Court Rule (MCR) 2.112(K), and therefore insufficient to “toll” the statute of limitations to allow amendment of the plaintiffs’ complaint to add that party to the lawsuit.

The issue in this case arose when the trial court judge allowed amendment of the complaint in the underlying class action to occur to add a defendant, Consumers Energy (Consumers), even after the statute of limitations as to Consumers had run.

The Court allowed the amendment on the basis that the statute of limitations could be extended because the original defendant named Consumers as a potentially responsible nonparty in an affirmative defense in its answer (which was filed 2 (technically 3) days before the statute of limitations would have expired as to Consumers).  However, the original Defendant never filed a notice of fault of nonparties as required by MCR 2.112(K).

Consumers was added to the lawsuit via an amended complaint, with the trial court ruling that despite the failure to comply with MCR 2.112(K), the affirmative defense was sufficient to allow the filing of the amended complaint and toll the statute of limitations. The original Defendant Michigan Petroleum clearly had notice and knew or should have known that Consumers was likely to be a potential defendant and could have filed a proper “notice of nonparty at fault”.

On August 4, 2009 a fire occurred at a building owned by the defendant Michigan Petroleum Technologies (Michigan Petroleum) and destroyed the building.  The fire was very large and involved noxious fumes and smoke.  An investigator from Consumers performed a site investigation at the location of the fire on August 5, 2009.  A subsequent investigation performed by Consumers and an independent engineer hired by them concluded that Consumers was not to blame for the fire.

Within a few weeks of the fire, Consumers received letters from two separate law firms, implying that Consumers was responsible and would be named as a defendant in a lawsuit by either Michigan Petroleum or the insurance company that insured the building.  Neither the building owner (Michigan Petroleum), nor the insurance company that insured the building filed any claim or lawsuit against Consumers.

On June 20, 2012, a personal injury class action lawsuit was filed in Genessee County Circuit Court naming only Michigan Petroleum as a defendant and seeking damages in tort, among other claims including nuisance (all of the claims in the underlying lawsuit are subject to the three-year statute of limitations in the revised judicature act (RJA), MCL 500.5805(10)).

Michigan Petroleum did not file a notice of non-party at fault within the 30 days provided by MCL 600.2957(2).

On August 2, 2012 (two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations as against Consumers), Michigan Petroleum filed an answer.

On October 8, 2012, after the three-year statute of limitations had run as to Consumers, the circuit court entered a “stipulated order” allowing, inter alia, the plaintiffs to “add” Consumers as a defendant in the lawsuit.

An “amended” complaint was served on Consumers on October 19, 2012, alleging causes of action in nuisance and negligence, all governed by the three-year statute of limitations as pronounced in the RJA.

The legal issue then briefed and argued in early 2013 was whether the naming of a party by a defendant in an affirmative defense under MCR 2.111(F) has the same legal effect as the filing of a “notice of nonparty fault” under MCR 2.112(K).  The significance is that MCR 2.112(K) then allows for “tolling” of the statute of limitations pursuant to MCL 600.2957(2).

The trial court did not squarely address that issue.  Rather, the trial court found since there were no cases stating that an affirmative defense is insufficient, the naming of the potential nonparty at fault (Consumers) in the affirmative defense was “sufficient” to activate the “tolling” provision of MCL 600.2957(2) and therefore the trial court denied Consumers’ motion to dismiss.

The COA had originally denied leave to appeal.  The Supreme Court remanded as on leave granted.

This is a published opinion which (1) clarifies the specificity with which one must name a “non-party at fault” for purposes of comparative fault allocation as against that party; and, more importantly, (2) rejects the trial court’s reasoning that mere mentioning of a potentially responsible party in the defendant’s affirmative defense is sufficient to put that party on notice and subject it to a lawsuit even after the statute of limitations has expired as to that party.

Read the opinion here:  Taylor.et.al.v.MPT.et.al.OPN

Effective appellate representation demands different skills than those required by litigation attorneys.  Appellate attorneys are adept at analyzing the intricacies of each case from an objective and critical perspective.  From reviewing and preparing the lower court record, identifying errors for appeal, and developing a strategy to raise those issues that will be addressed by appellate courts, appellate attorneys are capable of handling the most complex appeals from the application stage to oral advocacy before the highest courts.  Our research abilities and knowledge of current issues in nearly all major subject-matter areas of the law provide our clients with efficient and immediate assistance with complex and high-exposure cases.

We are also experienced at navigating through all appellate courts to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and quickly ruled upon.

Below are some of the recent significant cases prosecuted by the Appeals and Legal Research Group.

• Omian v. Chrysler, LLC, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310743, remanded by Supreme Court as on leave granted, Supreme Court No. 146908, oral argument presented July 16, 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for Chrsyler, LLC
• Moore v. Nolff’s Construction and Travelers Ins., Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 313478 and 313440 (consolidated), application and cross-application granted and oral argument in Court of Appeals presented July 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for Nolff’s Construction and Travelers Insurance
• Arbuckle v. GM, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310611, oral argument in Court of Appeals presented May 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for GM
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (201_), amicus curiae brief filed for Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Townships Association on June 16, 2014, after remand by Carson J. Tucker
• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated May 6, 2014 (Docket No. 313638), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker for Wayne County
• Omian v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 495 Mich. 859 (2013), application filed by Carson J. Tucker, Supreme Court remand to Court of Appeals on leave granted, oral argument to be held in July 2014
• Ghanam v. John Does, 303 Mich. App. 522 (2013), application to appeal filed in Supreme Court by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, ___ Mich App ___ (2013), amicus curiae for Oakland County in support of MMRMA application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ 201_), application granted, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (201_), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae for Oakland, Macomb and Wayne County filed by Carson J. Tucker in support of the state’s application
• Huddleston v. Trinity Health, et al., 495 Mich. 976 (2014), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae with Lawrence Garcia, Esq., for MDTC
• Ashley, LLC v Pittsfield Twp., 494 Mich 875 (2013), application granted, for Pittsfield Township by Carson J. Tucker (resolved by settlement)
• Bailey v. Schaaf, ___ Mich ___ (2013), amicus curiae for MDTC by Carson J. Tucker
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich 707 (2012), oral argument on application, Court of Appeals case reversed by opinion, Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• McMurtrie v Eaton Corp, 490 Mich 976 (2011)
• Findley v DaimlerChrysler Corp., 490 Mich 928 (2011)
• Brewer v. AD.Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich 50 (2010)
• Stokes v Chrysler, 481 Mich 266 (2008)
• Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269 (2008)
• Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics, 469 Mich 220 (2003)

Supreme Court to Address Interplay (If Any) Between the No-Fault Act and the Governmental Tort Liability Act

Last Friday, September 19, 2014, I participated in a panel discussion at the Negligence Law Section breakout at the state bar conference in Grand Rapids to discuss the Michigan Supreme Court’s upcoming (October 8) hearing of oral arguments in the calendar cases of Hunter v. Sisco, et al, and Hannay v. MDOT, the latter in which I submitted an amicus curiae brief for Michigan Townships Association, and the counties of Macomb, Oakland and Wayne (99705.sc.amicus.curiae.br).

Here is the two-paged handout distributed at the session. (Hunter-Hannay Venn Diagram Final.9.17.2014.1226 and Hunter Hannay page 2).

Based on the outcome of that event, there is still much debate about the result in Hunter (no noneconomic damages can be awarded against the government under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, even though such damages are ordinarily available against “civilian” defendants under Michigan’s Automobile Insurance “No-Fault” Act, MCL 500.3135).

Of course, Hannay came to the opposite conclusion, only with respect to “excess” economic (wage loss) and future earning potential, which is why the cases have been consolidated.

Some issues raised at the discussion concern how to quantify or identify “bodily injury” damages.

I believe this would be medical expenses related to the physical injury, only.  However, such “damages”, and liability therefor, are ordinarily borne by the first-party, no-fault carrier, not the third-party tortfeasor under MCL 500.3135.

Thus, how can any liability be imposed against the government when you mesh the outcome of applying the GTLA and the No-Fault Act to motor vehicle accidents in which the government’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle causes injury.  See the Venn Diagram I created (the overlap, if any, is the real sticking point and where the case law and/or the legislation will have to be reconciled, eventually).

One suggestion I have made is that perhaps the first-party, no-fault carrier can bring a subrogation action against the government if the PIP carrier can prove negligence and injury, just as a PIP carrier might seek subrogation under MCL 500.3109 from another carrier that is otherwise liable according to the law.  In my work on worker’s compensation cases, we see this a lot.  The no-fault carrier will seek to implicate the worker’s compensation carrier claiming the injuries incurred in an auto accident arose out of and in the course of employment, and thus, are the primary responsibility of the worker’s compensation carrier. Under the statute, the no-fault carrier steps into the shoes of the plaintiff seeking recovery of the benefits, and thus, the no-fault carrier would have to prove negligence and liability on the part of the government under the motor vehicle exception.  I think it could be argued MCL 500.3109 would work the same way vis-à-vis the government.  Although, this is just a theory.  Hunter / Hannay are not likely to address this latent issue.

Another issue that arose was the indication that even before the 1965 GTLA accidents caused by government owned/operated motor vehicles allowed for recovery of damages that were similar, if not identical in nature to noneconomic damages, i.e., pain and suffering, mental anguish, etc.

Why is the term “bodily injury” in the GTLA now restricted only to physical injury?  My answer would be the strict construction of statutes waiving the government’s immunity forbid court’s from expanding the meaning of terms.  Although, the counter to that is that the legislature adopted the term in the motor-vehicle exception with the “common law” definition allowing for such expanded damages in the first place.  This would be a good argument if not for the fact that we are discussing governmental immunity from liability and suit.  The assumption is only the legislature can waive the government’s immunity, and therefore, if the liability is to be “expanded” it has to come in express language.  The courts can restrict or limit the meaning of the terms in the GTLA exceptions, but they cannot expand the meaning.  This is well-established in Michigan case law.

Another theory I raised in my amicus brief for MTA / Oakland, Wayne, and Macomb counties was whether the government can ever be liable for first-party PIP benefits under the no-fault act when the motor vehicle exception requires a demonstration of “fault” on the part of the government.

This is also not an issue that will be addressed by Hunter / Hannay, but given the jurisdictional nature of government immunity, and the fact the government is immune from liability unless within the explicit legislative exceptions of the GTLA, it is a question that will have to be answered eventually (even thought the government has presumed it is subject to the No-Fault Act for the more than 40 years of the latter’s existence, and of course, continues to participate in the system as both a No-Fault “PIP” carrier (either self-insured, or through an auto insurance carrier (or both))), and as a presumptive third-party tortfeasor.

The question was also raised why, if Hannay came out as a published opinion before Hunter, which it did, why Hunter did not follow Hannay under the “first out” rule.  Although, that matters little if the Supreme Court has consolidated the cases to address the issues.

Finally, as I noted in my presentation, Hunter actually retained the “threshold injury / serious impairment” analysis even though it rules there are no noneconomic damages available under the No-Fault Act.

What does this mean?  Why would the threshold injury analysis even matter if the government is only responsible for “bodily injury”?  Does this mean that the government is only responsible for serious impairment or threshold “bodily injury” and nothing below, or less than that?

I doubt this is what the COA panel in Hunter meant, but it was a curious statement that they made at the end of the opinion.  Perhaps they were trying to reconcile their opinion with the Hardy v. Oakland County case in which the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff suing under the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, still had to prove threshold injuries under MCL 500.3135 of the No-Fault Act.

It will be interesting to see oral argument in the case on October 8.

Carson J. Tucker has participated in and argued some of the most significant governmental immunity cases in Michigan during the past decade.

Mr. Tucker presented direct representation to the governmental defendants and prosecuted the entire appeal, including all appellate briefings and oral arguments before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the following cases:

• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated May 6, 2014 (Docket No. 313638), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker for Wayne County
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich. 707 (August 20, 2012), application granted, and briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Supreme Court
• Gentry v. Wayne County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Carmona, unpublished opinion of hte Michigan Court of Appeals, dated October 11, 2011 (Docket No. 296580), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Court of Appeals
• Hamed v. Wayne County, 490 Mich. 1 (July 29, 2011), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
• Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459 (December 30, 2008), application for leave to appeal granted, and briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Supreme Court

In addition, Mr. Tucker has provided direct support to governmental entities in filing “friend of the court”, i.e., amicus curiae briefs in support of the governmental defendants in the following cases:

• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (2014), after remand order, amicus curiae brief filed for Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Townships Association on June 16, 2014, after remand by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, amicus curiae in Supreme Court for Oakland County, Wayne County, Macomb County, and Wayne County in support of MMRMA’s application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (2014), application granted and consolidated with Hunter v. Sisco, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae in Michigan Supreme Court for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker

Effective appellate representation demands different skills than those required by litigation attorneys.  Appellate attorneys are adept at analyzing the intricacies of each case from an objective and critical perspective.  From reviewing and preparing the lower court record, identifying errors for appeal, and developing a strategy to raise those issues that will be addressed by appellate courts, appellate attorneys are capable of handling the most complex appeals from the application stage to oral advocacy before the highest courts.  Our research abilities and knowledge of current issues in nearly all major subject-matter areas of the law provide our clients with efficient and immediate assistance with complex and high-exposure cases.

We are also experienced at navigating through all appellate courts to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and quickly ruled upon.

Below are some of the recent significant cases prosecuted by the Appeals and Legal Research Group.

• Omian v. Chrysler, LLC, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310743, remanded by Supreme Court as on leave granted, Supreme Court No. 146908, oral argument presented July 16, 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for Chrsyler, LLC
• Moore v. Nolff’s Construction and Travelers Ins., Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 313478 and 313440 (consolidated), application and cross-application granted and oral argument in Court of Appeals presented July 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for Nolff’s Construction and Travelers Insurance
• Arbuckle v. GM, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310611, oral argument in Court of Appeals presented May 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for GM
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (201_), amicus curiae brief filed for Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Townships Association on June 16, 2014, after remand by Carson J. Tucker
• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated May 6, 2014 (Docket No. 313638), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker for Wayne County
• Omian v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 495 Mich. 859 (2013), application filed by Carson J. Tucker, Supreme Court remand to Court of Appeals on leave granted, oral argument to be held in July 2014
• Ghanam v. John Does, 303 Mich. App. 522 (2013), application to appeal filed in Supreme Court by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, ___ Mich App ___ (2013), amicus curiae for Oakland County in support of MMRMA application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ 201_), application granted, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (201_), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae for Oakland, Macomb and Wayne County filed by Carson J. Tucker in support of the state’s application
• Huddleston v. Trinity Health, et al., 495 Mich. 976 (2014), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae with Lawrence Garcia, Esq., for MDTC
• Ashley, LLC v Pittsfield Twp., 494 Mich 875 (2013), application granted, for Pittsfield Township by Carson J. Tucker (resolved by settlement)
• Bailey v. Schaaf, ___ Mich ___ (2013), amicus curiae for MDTC by Carson J. Tucker
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich 707 (2012), oral argument on application, Court of Appeals case reversed by opinion, Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• McMurtrie v Eaton Corp, 490 Mich 976 (2011)
• Findley v DaimlerChrysler Corp., 490 Mich 928 (2011)
• Brewer v. AD.Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich 50 (2010)
• Stokes v Chrysler, 481 Mich 266 (2008)
• Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269 (2008)
• Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics, 469 Mich 220 (2003)

“Gross Negligence” Exception to Governmental Immunity Under Attack in Cases Against First Responders / Law Enforcement Officers

The Court of Appeals has released two cases that appear to undermine the meaning of the “statutory” “gross negligence” exception, MCL 691.1407(2) under Michigan’s Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). The GTLA, MCL 691.1401 et seq., provides immunity for law enforcement officers and other individual governmental employees engaged in the discharge of a governmental function and while performing duties authorized by their position.  The only exceptions to an individual governmental employee’s immunity are the statutory “gross negligence” exception and the “bad faith / intentional tort” exception, the latter of which was articulated by the Michigan Supreme Court in the seminal case of Odom v. Deputy Christine Kelly and Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459 (2008), a case I successfully briefed and argued in the Supreme Court on behalf of Wayne County.

MCL 691.1407(2) provides that a governmental agency’s employee is “immune from tort liability” caused by the employee “while in the course of employment” if all of the following are true: (1) the employee is acting, or reasonably believes he or she is acting, within the scope of his or her authority; (2) the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function; and (3) the employee’s conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. MCL 691.1407(2).

The phrase “gross negligence” in the GTLA is a “statutory standard”, and thus is defined and applied by reference to the statute and the case law interpreting it.  See Costa v. Community Emergency Medical Services, Inc., 475 Mich. 403, 411-412 (2006), see also Odom, supra at 470.  Thus, common-law definitions and applications of “gross negligence” are not binding.

For example, an important product of limiting the standard by statute is exemplified in the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich. 439 (2000), which ruled, inter alia, that the statute required the employee’s conduct to be “the proximate cause” of the harm.  Id. at 445-446.  This means liability against the governmental employee, in that case law enforcement officers, can be imposed under the gross negligence exception only where the employee’s conduct is “the one, most immediate, efficient, and direct cause…of injur[y]….”  Id.  This is a crucial principle as in many cases the actions and reactions of governmental employees (especially, as in these cases, first responders and law enforcement officers) often occurs as the result of someone else’s negligent or criminal actions.  Since the statute requires to prove “gross negligence” against the employee, it must be shown the employee’s conduct was the proximate cause, i.e., the most immediate, efficient, or direct cause of the injuries complained of, liability can often be avoided by demonstrating the negligence of another, or even a break in the direct causal chain between the officer’s alleged “gross negligence” and the harm complained of.

The statute further defines “gross negligence” as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1407(7)(a) .

Importantly, although this is a substantive legal issue that has not been definitively resolved, the burden of pleading a cause of action in avoidance of governmental immunity rests on the claimant. Compare Mack v. City of Detroit 467 Mich. 186 (2002), with Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459 (2008).  The principle established in Mack is based on the jurisdictional principle of governmental immunity adhered to in Michigan.  Therefore, “immunity” is an inherent characteristic of government and cannot be waived without explicit consent of the Legislature.  Thus, merely pleading facts in avoidance of immunity, without more, is insufficient to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts over the cause of action.

Basically, allegations in a complaint should be supported by undisputed facts in order to lift the veil of immunity protecting the government.  However, this is not how the courts have interpreted and applied the principle of governmental immunity.  In Odom, supra, the Court made a distinction between actions brought against governmental entities, and actions brought against individual governmental employees.  In the latter case, for some unexplained reason, the Court noted that plaintiff’s did not bear the burden of pleading and proving an action in avoidance of immunity.  The ruling was not dispositive in the case, and thus, the case itself does not serve as precedent for the principle stated.

In these two recent cases, however, this application led the courts to find “questions of fact” based on alleged disputed evidence, and the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint alone, which were not necessarily supported by demonstrations of undisputed fact.

The facts of these two cases are remarkable.  In Estate of Young v. Pierce, the defendant, an emergency “first responder” employed by Montcalm County was responding to an emergency dispatch when he ran through a stop sign and crossed into an intersection.  His vehicle struck another vehicle killing the two occupants.  The Court of Appeals notes it was undisputed that the defendant ran through the stop sign, and that traffic on the cross road had the right of way. According to witnesses, the defendant was traveling at a high rate of speed (estimated at 80 mph) approximately 30 seconds before he arrived at the intersection; he had not activated his emergency lights or sirens, and he did not stop or slow down at the intersection.  The defendant claimed he did slow down and look before entering the intersection.  He also testified that he had activated his siren.

The trial court denied summary disposition on governmental immunity grounds per MCR 2.116(C)(7).  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Court noted there were “disputed factual” questions that could not be resolved without referring those questions to the scrutiny of a trial by jury.  Principally, the Court of Appeals panel noted the question of whether the defendant’s conduct rose to the statutory standard of “gross negligence” sufficient to withstand the governmental immunity defense was a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.

In Howard v. Pena, the defendant, a state trooper got lost while driving to a scheduled event for which he was assigned to provide law enforcement assistance.  He made a u-turn on a one-way street and crashed head-on into the plaintiff’s vehicle.  The plaintiff suffered serious injuries.  Testimony and other evidence presented demonstrated that there were signs indicating that the street was one-way.  The state trooper testified he was aware of the traffic regulations, but did not know that he was turning the wrong way onto a one-way road.

On reconsideration of an earlier dismissal order, the trial court ruled that because defendant had admitted to ignoring certain traffic control devices in violation of the law there was a question of fact as to whether his conduct rose to the level of gross negligence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Court applied the pleading rule that all allegations favored plaintiff, and thus, a question of fact remained as to whether the defendant’s conduct was “grossly negligent”.

These two cases highlight separate extant problems in the application by lower appellate courts of the statutory “gross negligence” standard.  In Estate of Young, supra, the Court allowed unsupported factual allegations to substitute for the type of supported factual allegations that should be required to prove in avoidance of immunity.  The Court of Appeals has stated, and the Supreme Court has agreed on more than one occasion, that governmental immunity means more than immunity from liability; it is supposed to provide immunity from litigation, i.e., the costs and expenditure of time and resources the government must commit to defend lawsuits based only on the unsupported allegations in a complaint.  If immunity from litigation can be avoided simply by factual allegations and unsupported claims then the purpose of immunity is irrelevant.  While the factual dispute in this case is whether and to what extent the defendant heeded the stop sign and provided proper warning, there was no question that he was responding to an emergency.  And, despite how the lower appellate courts have applied “gross negligence”, it is a standard that requires nearly culpable conduct, recklessness, and a demonstration of lack of care or compassion about the consequences of one’s conduct.  It is a standard that should be difficult to prove.

In Howard, the issue is a bit more subtle.  The lower court, and apparently, the Court of Appeals, latched on to the fact that the state trooper knew and disregarded the basic rules of traffic regulation.  But the panel does not demonstrate that there were factual disputes about the defendant’s state of mind.  Thus, although the trooper was not responding to an emergency and may have had more time to heed the conditions of traffic and his whereabouts, it seems the panel substitutes a disregard for the traffic regulations, for the statutory standard which requires a showing of a mental state rising to the level of reckless disregard and lack of concern about whether injury results in engagement of the conduct at issue.  The analysis in the latter case may have been sound if there was direct evidence that the trooper was intentionally turning the wrong way to get to the location he was supposed to be at on time.  In other words, if there was proof that the trooper knew he was turning the wrong way, and did so anyway because it was a short cut to the venue.  That seems to be the type of proof required by the statute as a reckless disregard and a willful ignorance of the potential consequences.

These two cases present difficult factual circumstances.  However, the rulings of law appear to allow unwarranted expansion of the “gross negligence” exception.  It will be interesting to see whether further appellate review will occur.

Carson J. Tucker has participated in and argued some of the most significant governmental immunity cases in Michigan during the past decade.

Mr. Tucker presented direct representation to the governmental defendants and prosecuted the entire appeal, including all appellate briefings and oral arguments before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the following cases:

• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated May 6, 2014 (Docket No. 313638), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker for Wayne County
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich. 707 (August 20, 2012), application granted, and briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Supreme Court
• Gentry v. Wayne County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Carmona, unpublished opinion of hte Michigan Court of Appeals, dated October 11, 2011 (Docket No. 296580), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Court of Appeals
• Hamed v. Wayne County, 490 Mich. 1 (July 29, 2011), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
• Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459 (December 30, 2008), application for leave to appeal granted, and briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker in the Supreme Court

In addition, Mr. Tucker has provided direct support to governmental entities in filing “friend of the court”, i.e., amicus curiae briefs in support of the governmental defendants in the following cases:

• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (2014), after remand order, amicus curiae brief filed for Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Townships Association on June 16, 2014, after remand by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, amicus curiae in Supreme Court for Oakland County, Wayne County, Macomb County, and Wayne County in support of MMRMA’s application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (2014), application granted and consolidated with Hunter v. Sisco, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae in Michigan Supreme Court for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker

Effective appellate representation demands different skills than those required by litigation attorneys.  Appellate attorneys are adept at analyzing the intricacies of each case from an objective and critical perspective.  From reviewing and preparing the lower court record, identifying errors for appeal, and developing a strategy to raise those issues that will be addressed by appellate courts, appellate attorneys are capable of handling the most complex appeals from the application stage to oral advocacy before the highest courts.  Our research abilities and knowledge of current issues in nearly all major subject-matter areas of the law provide our clients with efficient and immediate assistance with complex and high-exposure cases.

We are also experienced at navigating through all appellate courts to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and quickly ruled upon.

Below are some of the recent significant cases prosecuted by the Appeals and Legal Research Group.

• Omian v. Chrysler, LLC, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310743, remanded by Supreme Court as on leave granted, Supreme Court No. 146908, oral argument presented July 16, 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for Chrsyler, LLC
• Moore v. Nolff’s Construction and Travelers Ins., Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 313478 and 313440 (consolidated), application and cross-application granted and oral argument in Court of Appeals presented July 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for Nolff’s Construction and Travelers Insurance
• Arbuckle v. GM, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310611, oral argument in Court of Appeals presented May 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for GM
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (201_), amicus curiae brief filed for Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Townships Association on June 16, 2014, after remand by Carson J. Tucker
• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated May 6, 2014 (Docket No. 313638), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker for Wayne County
• Omian v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 495 Mich. 859 (2013), application filed by Carson J. Tucker, Supreme Court remand to Court of Appeals on leave granted, oral argument to be held in July 2014
• Ghanam v. John Does, 303 Mich. App. 522 (2013), application to appeal filed in Supreme Court by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, ___ Mich App ___ (2013), amicus curiae for Oakland County in support of MMRMA application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ 201_), application granted, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (201_), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae for Oakland, Macomb and Wayne County filed by Carson J. Tucker in support of the state’s application
• Huddleston v. Trinity Health, et al., 495 Mich. 976 (2014), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae with Lawrence Garcia, Esq., for MDTC
• Ashley, LLC v Pittsfield Twp., 494 Mich 875 (2013), application granted, for Pittsfield Township by Carson J. Tucker (resolved by settlement)
• Bailey v. Schaaf, ___ Mich ___ (2013), amicus curiae for MDTC by Carson J. Tucker
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich 707 (2012), oral argument on application, Court of Appeals case reversed by opinion, Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• McMurtrie v Eaton Corp, 490 Mich 976 (2011)
• Findley v DaimlerChrysler Corp., 490 Mich 928 (2011)
• Brewer v. AD.Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich 50 (2010)
• Stokes v Chrysler, 481 Mich 266 (2008)
• Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269 (2008)
• Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics, 469 Mich 220 (2003)

“No-Fault” Wage-Loss Benefits Required to Be Paid to Unemployed Claimant Suffering Disabling Injury at the Time of Auto Accident

In Jones v. Home Owners Ins. Co.COA, a 2-1 unpublished opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a claimant suffering disabling injury in an auto accident was entitled to no-fault wage-loss benefits under Michigan’s No-Fault Act, characterizing her as “temporarily unemployed” under MCL 500.3107a.

MCL 500.3107 of the No-Fault Act provides for first-party insurer “work-loss benefits” for up to three years after a claimant suffers injury in an automobile accident.  MCL 500.3107(1)(b) defines “work loss” as “consisting of loss of income from work an injured person would have performed during the first 3 years after the date of the accident if he or she had not been injured.”  A party claiming work-loss benefits under this provision must show actual wage loss; a mere loss of earning capacity is not sufficient.  MCL 500.3107(1)(b); Davis v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 159 Mich. App. 734 (1987).

MCL 500.3107a takes this measured definition of work loss and applies it to the “temporarily unemployed”.  Thus, an insured may be found to be “temporarily unemployed” where he or she is, or would have been, but for the accident, actively seeking employment and there is evidence showing the unemployed status would not have been permanent.

A claimant seeking benefits under this provision must provide “independent corroboration” of both intent and actions taken to secure employment during the period of “temporary unemployment”.  Bare assertions of such intent are insufficient to invoke the right to these specific no-fault benefits.

In the instant case, the claimant was unemployed when she was injured in an automobile accident.  She sought first-party “wage-loss benefits” from her no-fault insurance carrier.  The insurer denied benefits on the basis that she was unemployed at the time of the accident and her circumstances did not meet the definition of “temporarily unemployed” within the meaning of MCL 500.3107(b)(1) and MCL 500.3107a.  The insurer conceded the plaintiff had been actively seeking work at the time of her injury, and during the period thereafter.  However, the insurer argued there was no evidence of any actual job offer and thus the evidence failed to establish she was only “temporarily unemployed” before the accident.

The question was presented to a jury.  The jury found that the plaintiff satisfied the requirement of “temporary unemployment” under the No-Fault Act and ordered benefits to be paid by the insurer.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of her job search efforts, and there was a reasonable likelihood that she would have been hired for a particular job opportunity she was contacted about days before the disabling accident.

Judge Saad dissents.  His opinion points out the problem with this provision of the No-Fault Act, which appears to allow wage-loss benefits to be awarded based only on speculation that a particular job opportunity would have come to fruition.

Judge Saad concludes that because the plaintiff could not prove a causal connection between the accident and an actual loss of income, benefits should not have been awarded.  Under MCL 500.3107(1)(b) a claimant seeking work-loss benefits must suffer wage loss or loss of income they would have earned but for the accident.  Judge Saad contends that this “measured definition” of “work loss benefits” then must be read in conjunction with the “special category” of accident victims:  the “temporarily unemployed”.  That provision allows wage loss benefits to be awarded where a person is “temporarily unemployed at the time of the accident or during the period of disability….”  MCL 500.3107a.

Reading the two provisions together, Judge Saad contends a person’s search for employment before and after an accident does not establish the prerequisite causal connection between the accident and the wage loss.  Because plaintiff’s evidence that she was a candidate for a potential job was not demonstrable proof that she would have actually secured such employment, she could not demonstrate she was temporarily unemployed, or as Judge Saad puts it “she provided no ‘evidence showing [her] unemployed status would not have been permanent if the injury had not occurred.'”  Slip Op. at 3.

This is an important decision, but it does little to aid the apparent gap in the statutory language that appears to allow wage-loss benefits to be awarded to someone who is in fact, like Plaintiff, unemployed (whether temporarily or not) at the time of the accident.  The statute provides no guidance on the necessity of showing a status other than unemployed before the accident, and whether that status was close in time to the accident, or, as in some cases, years prior.  In other words, the statute appears to allow an award of wage-loss benefits based merely upon the fact of a prior job, and a claimant’s assertions that they were seeking employment at the time of the accident.

Although the majority appears to follow the law in this case, and the facts appear to fulfill existing judicial interpretation of the meaning of “temporarily unemployed” under MCL 500.3107a, there are cases in which this provision can be abused precisely for the reasons set forth in Judge Saad’s dissent.

How can an insurer counter evidence proffered to demonstrate that a claimant ‘s “unemployed status would not have been permanent”?

Perhaps more searching inquiry should be made regarding the diligence and scope of the job search effort, the individual’s post-injury wage-earning capacity, and job availability in general.  What if the economic downturn makes it impossible for even the most qualified individual to obtain a job paying wages similar to those upon which the award is based, i.e., the last preceding job?  In such circumstances, how “temporary” is “temporary unemployment” if not for the entire three-year period that no-fault benefits are available under the No-Fault Act?

Perhaps vocational and rehabilitation expert evidence should be used to establish these factors, as with worker’s compensation claimant’s burden to prove an entitlement to total, as opposed to partial, or no, wage-loss benefits, i.e., the “disability and wage loss” provisions of MCL 418.301 of the Workers Disability Compensation Act.

I suspect the decision will be appealed to the Supreme Court for further evaluation.

Effective appellate representation demands different skills than those required by litigation attorneys.  Appellate attorneys are adept at analyzing the intricacies of each case from an objective and critical perspective.  From reviewing and preparing the lower court record, identifying errors for appeal, and developing a strategy to raise those issues that will be addressed by appellate courts, appellate attorneys are capable of handling the most complex appeals from the application stage to oral advocacy before the highest courts.  Our research abilities and knowledge of current issues in nearly all major subject-matter areas of the law provide our clients with efficient and immediate assistance with complex and high-exposure cases.

We are also experienced at navigating through all appellate courts to shepherd the appeal in the most expeditious fashion possible so that it can be reviewed and quickly ruled upon.

Below are some of the recent significant cases prosecuted by the Appeals and Legal Research Group.

• Omian v. Chrysler, LLC, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310743, remanded by Supreme Court as on leave granted, Supreme Court No. 146908, oral argument presented July 16, 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for Chrsyler, LLC
• Moore v. Nolff’s Construction and Travelers Ins., Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 313478 and 313440 (consolidated), application and cross-application granted and oral argument in Court of Appeals presented July 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for Nolff’s Construction and Travelers Insurance
• Arbuckle v. GM, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No. 310611, oral argument in Court of Appeals presented May 2014 by Carson J. Tucker for GM
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich. App. ___ (201_), amicus curiae brief filed for Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Townships Association on June 16, 2014, after remand by Carson J. Tucker
• Estate of Truett v. Wayne County, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated May 6, 2014 (Docket No. 313638), briefed and argued by Carson J. Tucker for Wayne County
• Omian v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 495 Mich. 859 (2013), application filed by Carson J. Tucker, Supreme Court remand to Court of Appeals on leave granted, oral argument to be held in July 2014
• Ghanam v. John Does, 303 Mich. App. 522 (2013), application to appeal filed in Supreme Court by Carson J. Tucker
• State Farm v. MMRMA, ___ Mich App ___ (2013), amicus curiae for Oakland County in support of MMRMA application, by Carson J. Tucker
• Hannay v MDOT, ___ Mich ___ 201_), application granted, amicus curiae filed for Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County and Wayne County, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• Yono v. MDOT, ___ Mich ___ (201_), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae for Oakland, Macomb and Wayne County filed by Carson J. Tucker in support of the state’s application
• Huddleston v. Trinity Health, et al., 495 Mich. 976 (2014), oral argument on application granted, amicus curiae with Lawrence Garcia, Esq., for MDTC
• Ashley, LLC v Pittsfield Twp., 494 Mich 875 (2013), application granted, for Pittsfield Township by Carson J. Tucker (resolved by settlement)
• Bailey v. Schaaf, ___ Mich ___ (2013), amicus curiae for MDTC by Carson J. Tucker
• Atkins v. SMART, 492 Mich 707 (2012), oral argument on application, Court of Appeals case reversed by opinion, Carson J. Tucker
• Hagerty v Manistee, 493 Mich 933 (2013), amicus curiae for Michigan Municipal League, et al., by Carson J. Tucker
• McMurtrie v Eaton Corp, 490 Mich 976 (2011)
• Findley v DaimlerChrysler Corp., 490 Mich 928 (2011)
• Brewer v. AD.Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich 50 (2010)
• Stokes v Chrysler, 481 Mich 266 (2008)
• Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269 (2008)
• Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics, 469 Mich 220 (2003)